From: DrPepper Date: Fri Feb 15, 2002 10:15am Subject: Re: Photo Radar Countermeasures Actually, Spain is the most dangerous place to drive an automobile in the world. The seem to have no sense of danger out on the highways, and lethal accidents are very common They really need SOMETHING to slow people down. But then again, ignorance can be cured but stupidity is forever ========================================= Michael Puchol wrote: > Very well said. In Spain, until last week, police had to pull you over after > taking your picture with a radar trap, to positively identify you and give > you the ticket - this meant only about 10% of pics taken were notified. > ==================snippy de deee=================== -- Dr Pepper aka WB6GKI in the High Desert of California. Check out my LIVE Hamshack Cam at: http://www1.iwvisp.com/DrPepper/ham/ham.htm 4804 From: Craig Snedden Date: Fri Feb 15, 2002 2:17pm Subject: RE: Photo Radar Countermeasures Nope, disagree. Cyprus is pretty hairy. Traffic lights: Green - Go very fast, Amber - Go Faster, Red - Put your foot down...... -----Original Message----- From: DrPepper [mailto:DrPepper@i...] Sent: 15 February 2002 16:15 To: Michael Puchol Cc: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] Photo Radar Countermeasures Actually, Spain is the most dangerous place to drive an automobile in the world. The seem to have no sense of danger out on the highways, and lethal accidents are very common They really need SOMETHING to slow people down. But then again, ignorance can be cured but stupidity is forever ========================================= Michael Puchol wrote: > Very well said. In Spain, until last week, police had to pull you over after > taking your picture with a radar trap, to positively identify you and give > you the ticket - this meant only about 10% of pics taken were notified. > ==================snippy de deee=================== -- Dr Pepper aka WB6GKI in the High Desert of California. Check out my LIVE Hamshack Cam at: http://www1.iwvisp.com/DrPepper/ham/ham.htm ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 4805 From: gkeenan Date: Fri Feb 15, 2002 3:53pm Subject: Re: Photo Radar Countermeasures Ever try driving in Egypt? Cairo or Alexandria? Or better yet, take the "lovely" trip down the road alongside the Nile between the two cities! Lights? What Lights? We don't need no stinking lights!" What yellow line? I thought you only signed on a dotted line! I sure had lots of fun there!! Jerry Keenan GPKeenan Co., Int'l Security Services West Islip, NY ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Snedden" To: Sent: Friday, February 15, 2002 3:17 PM Subject: RE: [TSCM-L] Photo Radar Countermeasures > Nope, disagree. > > Cyprus is pretty hairy. Traffic lights: Green - Go very fast, Amber - Go > Faster, Red - Put your foot down...... > > > > 4806 From: Justin T. Fanning Date: Fri Feb 15, 2002 9:01pm Subject: NY Times: How to Fake a Passport (10-Feb-2002) I'm not normally taken to posting news stories on mailing lists, but this is such an exceptional piece I really think all the law enforcement types will enjoy. JMA: No more off topic posts I promise ;) JF --- http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/10/magazine/10PASSPORT.html?pagewanted=all New York Times February 10, 2002 How to Fake a Passport By JEFF GOODELL Alain Boucar flips open a passport and holds it under an ultraviolet light. A background image of Belgium's royal palace, faintly printed on the page, vanishes. ''See that?'' he says. He holds another Belgian passport under the spooky purple light. The image on this one is printed in a special reactive ink. It glows brightly. ''The first one's a complete counterfeit,'' he announces. Boucar is the director of the antifraud unit for the Belgian federal police. A genial 44-year-old, he works in a small, plain office in Brussels that is strewn with dozens of passports. It's only 10 a.m., but it has already been a busy day -- there has been an urgent call from an Interpol agent in Berlin, and another from a security officer on a Dutch cruise ship. Each wanted information from Boucar about suspicious Belgian passports. Every few minutes, a uniformed cop wanders through with a question about a suspect document. ''No good,'' he says with disgust upon being handed an Italian ID card. Lousy fakes annoy Boucar; they are not worthy of his connoisseur's eye. Boucar's colleague Thierry Descamps steps into his office. He is holding a fax. Descamps nods to the phone and mentions the name of a Belgian police officer on the antiterrorism task force. Boucar grabs the phone and his face becomes suddenly serious -- the inner cop emerges. While Boucar listens on the phone, he turns to his computer and calls up a database nicknamed Braingate, which is the Belgian police's repository of 1.4 million stolen and fraudulent documents from all over the world. The antiterrorism cop is calling about two Sri Lankans, Nicolas Sebastianpillai and Varunalingam Arudthevan, who were arrested in Faro, Portugal, on Sept. 12, en route to New York. They were traveling on Belgian passports -- stolen ones, that is. (Portuguese security detected a fake stamp on their passports and contacted the Belgian police, who found the passport numbers in Braingate.) Interpol investigators soon began aggressively pursuing suspected links between the men and the Tamil Tigers, the violent Sri Lankan terrorist group. Now the antiterrorism cop wants to know how they got their hands on these Belgian passports. Boucar punches in the numbers of the passports confiscated by the police in Portugal: EC 503103 and EC 503104. Boucar learns that these two passports were stolen in March, in transit from Belgium to Madagascar: a batch of 25 blank passports was lifted out of a supposedly secure diplomatic pouch. Of all forms of passport fraud, this is one of the most frightening. Only the very best counterfeits make it past airport security. But authentic blank passports, when filled out correctly, are extremely difficult to detect. Virtually the only way to trip up a person traveling on an authentic passport is if he makes an error filling it out or if the passport number turns up in a database of stolen documents. That's why Braingate is so invaluable; without it, the Sri Lankans might well have made it all the way to New York. Boucar searches Braingate for more information. He tells the cop on the other end of the line that he can find no evidence that the other 23 passports stolen in the same batch have been used by terrorists -- or anyone else, for that matter. Of course, that doesn't mean they haven't been, Boucar tells me. It just means nobody has been caught yet trying to use them. In fact, they have almost surely been sold on the black market, providing two dozen fresh opportunities for terrorists to sneak across international borders. These 23 passports, Boucar admits, are hardly the only Belgian passports circulating on the black market. In fact, his country has quietly become the global capital of identity fraud. According to the Belgian police, 19,050 blank Belgian passports have been stolen since 1990. This is probably some kind of record, although other problem countries, like Italy, Argentina and South Africa, refuse to confirm numbers. All these Belgian passports were not stolen in a few grand heists. Rather, small stashes were grabbed from various town halls, embassies, consulates and honorary consulates. Sold on the black market for as much as $7,500, they have subsequently been used by human traffickers, sex traffickers, gun runners and drug dealers, not to mention terrorists. Indeed, for terrorists making excursions outside the Middle East, Belgian passports are often the document of choice. Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian convicted of plotting to blow up Los Angeles International Airport in 1999, trafficked in a number of false passports, at least one of which was linked to a theft from a town hall in Belgium. And the two members of a Qaeda cell who assassinated the Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud just before Sept. 11 traveled from Brussels to London to Karachi on stolen Belgian passports. Until this fall, Belgium's passport troubles were little noticed. The Massoud murder, however, exposed the country's problem to the world. It was a huge embarrassment for a small, chronically insecure country that has been working hard to cast itself as one of the economic and political capitals of the New Europe. After Sept. 11, Belgian investigators immediately began tracking down clues. The passports used by the Massoud assassins, Boucar discovered, were stolen in two separate break-ins: one at the Belgian consulate in Strasbourg, France, on June 26, 1999, when 45 passports were stolen, and another a few months later, on Nov. 11, 1999, when 20 were stolen from the Belgian Embassy in The Hague. The Belgian police are now desperately trying to tighten up security. But even if they succeed, Boucar will be busy for years to come. Terrorists are too determined and the desire for fake passports is too great. Moreover, thousands of stolen Belgian documents remain circulating around the world. Boucar looks up from his computer and gives me a weary look. ''Since Sept. 11,'' he says, ''it has been chaos around here.'' Belgium is, at first glance, a most unlikely spot for chaos. But its longstanding reputation as a sleepy gateway between France and Northern Europe is precisely what has made it attractive to criminals. ''Brussels is at the crossroads of Europe, and an enormous amount of human traffic passes through it,'' says Jonathan M. Winer, a former State Department official and an international-crime expert. ''As a result, Belgium is the place where all sorts of crime seems to settle: drugs, human trafficking, prostitution and identity fraud.'' To get a feeling for this criminal nexus, all you have to do is take a walk along the gritty boulevards around the Gare du Midi in Brussels. The neighborhood's main thoroughfare, Boulevard Maurice Lemonnier, is known to locals as Kandahar Lane. Spits of glistening meat turn in the windows of restaurants, and Middle Eastern music blares from CD shops. The whole neighborhood feels wired to another world: cabins du telephone offer cheap, untraceable communications; Internet cafes let you surf the Web anonymously for two euros an hour; travel shops advertise weekly bus-and-ferry service to Tangier. According to investigators, it was here at the Dar Salaam hotel that Richard Reid, the accused ''shoe bomber,'' recently spent 10 days plotting to blow up an American Airlines jet. (As if to underscore Belgium's reputation as the back office of terrorism, when Reid was arrested, a map of Brussels was found in his jacket pocket.) The Dar Salaam is more flophouse than hotel, with lots of old linoleum and chipped paint and a cafe on the ground floor that is jammed with Arab men smoking and drinking tea. A few steps away is Marrakech, an Internet cafe where Reid apparently made arrangements to pick up explosives. On the same block is another terrorist landmark: Le Nil, the restaurant where, on Sept. 19, Belgian police officers found chemicals that had supposedly been stored there by members of a Tunisian network linked to Al Qaeda. Investigators suspect that the chemicals -- 220 pounds of sulfur and 16 gallons of acetone -- were going to be used to build a bomb to blow up the United States Embassy in Paris. Just across another boulevard from the Dar Salaam is a row of shadowy bars and hotels that face the southern side of the train station. This is the end of Arab turf and, according to the Belgian police, the beginning of a neighborhood controlled by the Albanian mob. The bars and hotels here all have a forsaken look and all seem to be populated by desperate Eastern European men. Here the games are human trafficking, sex trafficking and false documents. ''If you want a passport, this is where you begin to make inquiries,'' says Herman Lefief, a Belgian investigator. The process is never quick, especially if you are a foreigner or unknown to the sellers. Luk Alloo, a Dutch television journalist who recently purchased a middling-quality counterfeit Belgian passport for $1,500 as part of an undercover investigation, spent three months working similar mob-controlled bars in Antwerp before he found anyone who trusted him enough to get him a passport. ''They never keep anything on the premises,'' Alloo says. ''They have connections, who have connections, who have connections. It's an elaborate operation.'' Until recently, many of those connections eventually led to a little bar about two miles away on the Chausee de Ninove in the Anderlecht district of Brussels. Anderlecht is a gritty landscape of warehouses, falafel joints and muffler shops, but the bar itself is a cheerful enough place; there's a pool table in the center of the room, and video machines blink quietly against one wall. But according to the Belgian police, this bar was -- and may still be -- the base of operations for an Albanian mobster whom Belgian cops refer to as ''M.'' (For legal reasons, they will not allow his name to be published.) From his bar stool, M. ran what investigators say was one of the largest organized stolen-passport rings in Europe. M. bought and sold thousands of blanks on the black market. His prices ranged from a few hundred dollars for an easy-to-get Albanian passport to $5,000 or more for a newly stolen Belgian or French passport. Investigators have also linked M. to dozens of break-ins at embassies and consulates in Germany, the Netherlands and France. According to the Belgian police, M.'s network is typical of the complex link between organized crime, passport fraud and terrorism in Belgium. One afternoon in the lounge of the Belgian federal police building, an investigator named Daniel Traweels draws me a picture to help me visualize how it works. He sketches four circles across the top of the page, labeling them P for prostitution, H for human trafficking, D for drugs and T for terrorism. Below, Traweels draws four more circles, identifying them as Romanians, Albanians and other Eastern Europeans who specialize in burglary and document manipulation. In the middle, he draws another circle and connects the circles above and below to the center; he labels it M. ''It's a network,'' Traweels explains. ''He is the middleman. The circles on the top, the buyers, they are of every race: Chinese, Russian, Arab. We have Jewish mobsters who work with Arabs, Arabs who work with Albanians, North Africans who deal with Jews. There is no prejudice in this business.'' But there is specialization, Traweels explains. The Africans are mostly involved in money laundering. The Moroccans are involved in car-jackings, robberies. The Eastern Europeans, especially the Albanians, are expert burglars and safecrackers. These patterns rarely vary. Arabs don't get involved in burglary, nor do terrorist cells attempt large-scale passport theft. ''They leave the dirty work to the experts,'' Traweels says. Belgium's troubles with stolen blank passports really began only in 1995. At the time, Europe was in the midst of a push toward the creation of a unified state -- the European Union. As part of this transformation, European leaders decided to do away with almost all border controls within Western Europe. In theory, this was meant to simplify travel and, like the introduction of the euro currency, promote the idea of Europe as a coherent economic power. In practice, the lack of borders has also benefited criminals. A network of Albanians, many of them fleeing the war in the Balkans, found that Belgium was an ideal place to set up shop. Many of them got involved in importing human beings, especially young girls they could force into prostitution. For that, they needed passports. Although counterfeit documents were readily available in Bangkok -- one large counterfeiting operation was run by an ex-K.G.B. agent in Thailand -- the quality was often poor. Eventually, many of these Albanian outlaws, including M., discovered that instead of counterfeiting passports, it was much easier (and more profitable) to steal blanks. The Belgians made it particularly easy for them. The country's long history of provincial rule -- it didn't become an independent nation until 1831 -- meant that the mayors of tiny communities enjoyed enormous power. One of their perks of office was the ability to distribute passports; for decades, blank Belgian passports were stored in the 600 or so town halls around the country. Often, security amounted to nothing more elaborate than a locked door. In 1996 alone, 3,600 blank passports were stolen, bit by bit. In some cases, the thieves had to drill their way into a heavy safe to get to the passports -- and if they couldn't crack it, they ripped the safe right out of the wall and carted the whole thing off. In other cases, like a break-in at a town hall in Tongeren, the thieves simply helped themselves to a safe key that had thoughtlessly been left in a desk drawer. Usually there were no witnesses; the burglars left their tools behind, but little else, making the crime difficult to solve -- especially by the local cops, who, as one Belgian federal police officer put it, ''were not terribly worried about the loss of a hundred passports -- they just ordered more.'' Ultimately, it was pressure from the United States that finally persuaded the Belgians to crack down. Back in 1991, Belgium had been admitted to the United States visa-waiver program, which allows citizens from 29 friendly countries to enter this country without applying for a visa. But the fact that blank Belgian passports were being carted off by the truckload alarmed officials in the States. (The United States does not have a problem with passport theft; fewer than 50 blanks issued since 1990 remain unaccounted for.) By 1997, Belgium's troubles with stolen blanks had gotten so out of hand that United States officials threatened to kick the country out of the visa-waiver program. In 1998, Belgian officials began removing blank passports from town halls and storing them in an ultrasecure building in downtown Brussels. Passports are now distributed by courier, in a system similar to America's. But that didn't end Belgium's problems. Criminals like M. simply shifted their operations to Belgian consulates and embassies, which were equally insecure, and where hundreds of blanks continued to be stored. The old Belgian Embassy in The Hague, where one of the Massoud passports was stolen, was a typical case. By 18th-century standards, the charming brick town house is solid and secure. By 21st-century standards, it's a joke: there are no bars on the front windows, and the locks look as if they could be jimmied with a screwdriver. Belgium has 110 embassies and consulates worldwide, some more secure than others. It's no wonder that burglars find them so inviting. Last year, the Belgian Embassy in The Hague was finally moved to a secure building across the street from a police station. As for the stolen passports, they quickly vanish into the criminal underground. The 506 Belgian passports that were stolen from the consulate in Cologne in August 1999 have been found all over the world -- Madrid, Istanbul, Rotterdam, Lagos, Bangkok, Islamabad -- and have been used in a wide variety of crimes, from drug dealing to human trafficking. (Belgian authorities won't say if any ended up in the hands of terrorists.) The passports stolen in Strasbourg and The Hague were used for illegal entry into Congo, China and Morocco; another was found in a house in Rotterdam where three men suspected to have links with Al Qaeda were arrested after Sept. 11. In the case of M., the cops got lucky. Last January, while executing a search warrant in Brussels on an unrelated case involving a 31-year-old Romanian, they turned up a trove of passport-trafficking goods: typewriters, scanners, immigration stamps for 56 countries, various identity documents (including a Spanish ID card, sans photo, filled out in the name of Bill Clinton) and some 150 stolen blanks -- including 43 Belgian, as well as others from Sweden, Greece and Germany. Most important, however, they found documents and phone records suggesting that the Romanian was one of the main passport suppliers for M. Investigators staked out the bar where M. conducted business. They logged his arrivals and exits; they tapped his cellphone. They concluded that his network included 50 to 60 people in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. But ultimately M. was too slick for them. After four months of surveillance, 140 Belgian cops moved in last April to bust his operation. They hoped to nail not only M. but also several notorious passport thieves and safecrackers. It didn't happen. Stashes of cash were found, but the police failed to uncover any major cache of forged or stolen documents. M. himself was clean; searches of his apartment and car turned up nothing more damning than a gun and a bulletproof vest. M. was held in custody for two months, and he bragged to investigators that he had 30 million Belgian francs hidden in an overseas account that they could never find. And they couldn't. In the end, M. was charged with nothing more serious than consorting with a known criminal organization. Given the almost imperceptible speed of the Belgian courts, he will stand trial in two or three years. Until then, M. is back on the street and, presumably, back in business. Alain Boucar is extraordinarily proud of Belgium's new high-tech passport. Flipping through one and pointing out its many security features, he's as giddy as a new father showing off his child: ''It's a very beautiful design, don't you think?'' he says, holding it up to the light. Indeed it is. Thanks largely to this new passport, which Boucar helped design and which was introduced last March, M.'s business probably isn't quite as breezy today as it was last year. By all accounts, it's one of the most secure passports in the world. On the first page there's a graphic illustrating five key security features, including a laser-cut pinhole image of the passport holder, a watermark of King Albert II and an optically variable image of Belgium (which changes from green to blue depending on the viewing angle). ''Most border-control officers have one minute or less to look at a passport and determine if it is genuine,'' Boucar says. ''With this, at least they know what they're looking for.'' This new passport is a triumph for Belgium and a sign that it is taking its problems with passport fraud seriously. Even if characters like M. get their hands on blank versions of this passport, because of features like a digitized photo they will be much more difficult to fill in convincingly. Other countries, including the United States, are similarly upgrading their passports. Still, it will be years before these new passports make it into wide circulation. Until then, we're stuck with the old documents. As an example, I show Boucar my United States passport. ''How easy would it be for you to put someone else's picture in here?'' Boucar examines it. It's a standard United States passport, issued eight years ago, with a laminated photo page. ''Five minutes.'' He sticks his thumbnail into a corner of the laminate, showing me how you can peel it back. (You can loosen the laminate by sticking it in the freezer or a microwave oven -- it depends on the type of laminate -- or, better yet, by dissolving the adhesive with Undu, a product that is easily ordered on the Internet.) Boucar then points to the little blue emblem, called a guilloche, that overlaps the photo and the passport page and is supposed to make the photo difficult to remove. ''You might see a little line here. But if I do a good job, you would not notice.'' Of course, that person would have to be around the same age, height and weight as me, but Boucar's point is well taken: doing a passable job of doctoring a typical passport is not very hard. Boucar then explains the tricks criminals use to fill in stolen blanks: how they feed passports into laser printers, for example. Or how they can create a perfectly good dry stamp -- an inkless stamp that leaves an embossed image on paper and is used to authenticate the passports of many countries -- by placing an old vinyl record over a passport marked with a real seal, then heating the record with an iron; the record is then pressed onto a fresh passport. Candle wax also works. As for ink stamps, they pose no challenge at all. Years ago, forgers would cut a fresh potato in half and use it to transfer a stamp from one passport to another. Today ''you just scan the page of a passport into a computer, print it out, then take it to a copy shop,'' Boucar says. ''They'll make you a rubber stamp in two minutes.'' Boucar is something of a heretic in law enforcement circles, in which open discussion of such techniques is frowned upon, lest forgers get any new ideas. Boucar says that's nonsense. ''The forgers already know everything,'' he says. ''It's the rest of the world that we must educate.'' Indeed, bearers of false documents often seem to know more about their business than many border guards. They know what kinds of questions will be asked by consular officers (for example, ''Who is the prime minister of Belgium?'') and what suspicious mannerisms to avoid. And experienced border-hoppers are experts at finding the weak link in the system. If Portugal is cracking down, they'll try entering Europe through Greece; later, they'll move on to Spain. They send patsies through first to test security. They know to carry bank statements (forged ones) and other supporting documents. Still, even the best make stupid mistakes. They print out a blank stolen passport in the wrong typeface. Or they misspell a word. One of the biggest arrests connected with the Sept. 11 attacks came in Dubai, when a passport official noticed some sloppy forgery on the French passport of Djamel Beghal. Beghal was arrested and interrogated; information he provided led to the breakup of a large European terrorist cell, including the arrest in Brussels of Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian whom Beghal identified as the leader in a plot to bomb the United States Embassy in Paris. In a perfect world, every traveler at every port of entry would get similarly close scrutiny. In the real world, however, that's impossible. The sheer volume of humans crossing borders every day -- some 30 million foreigners cross the United States' each month -- suggests that even where strict border controls are in place, not every traveler is going to get a careful look. What's more, immigration officers, like airline security personnel, tend to be underpaid and underprepared for the complexity of their job. There are 16 different versions of the United States passport alone in circulation. It takes a genuine passport scholar like Boucar to be able to detect the difference between a real and a fake passport from, say, Uzbekistan, not to mention whether every entry and exit stamp is authentic. As border traffic grows, then, often the only thing standing between a terrorist and downtown Manhattan is a database. The State Department and the I.N.S. share a vast system that contains, among other things, basic biographical information, like date of birth, of United States passport and visa holders. It also tracks blank stolen passports reported around the world as well as information about known terrorists and other high-level criminals. Every time a person enters the United States at one of the major ports of entry, his passport number is checked by the database. (At least it's supposed to be.) The I.N.S. also has a separate database called the Lookout system, which is its own record of stolen passports and intelligence information. These databases are useful tools, but they're still not foolproof. ''What you have to keep in mind,'' cautions Tom Furey, consul general at the United States Embassy in London, ''is the massive information overload.'' London is as good a place to see the strengths and weakness of this system as anywhere. The embassy there is one of the busiest in the world, issuing about 175,000 nonimmigrant visas a year to travelers from 188 different countries. It also issues 25,000 passports a year, mostly to United States citizens whose passports have been lost or stolen. I recently spent an afternoon in London watching the consular officers interview visa applicants, and I learned that the State Department's database is pretty good when it comes to basic information -- detecting, for example, whether an applicant's birth date matches his name, or determining if someone is lying about whether he has ever visited the United States before. Also, if he is traveling on a passport that was stolen, say, six months ago in a country that the United States has good relations with, he will probably be caught. But I also learned that there is a whole lot this database won't reveal. If a person has been convicted of a serious crime in another country, for example, it probably won't show up in the database. I watched one consular officer turn away a man who wanted to visit the United States after learning that the man had recently been convicted in England of sexually molesting his 8-year-old stepdaughter. The only reason the consular officer knew about it, however, was that the man brazenly told him about it when he was asked if he had ever been convicted of any crimes. Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, recently indicted on six counts of conspiracy, was on a terrorist-watch list in France but was nonetheless able to enter the United States without question. When it comes to stolen passports, the situation gets even more complex. To begin with, not every country shares information about stolen passports with us. And even when they are reported, there is a time lag between when the passports are stolen and when they are reported stolen. In the Massoud case, Belgian authorities sent out a fax on the break-in in The Hague six days after the burglary; the alert about the Strasbourg theft didn't go out until almost six weeks after the break-in. In theory, the passport numbers should have been entered into databases immediately -- most people sophisticated enough to travel on a blank stolen passport know it needs to be used quickly. However, one antifraud investigator in the State Department says he was not aware of these stolen-passport numbers until ''the middle of the summer'' -- nearly a year after the passports were stolen. The closer you look, the scarier it gets. One example: Alain Boucar says that his database lists the numbers of 24,851 blank stolen Italian passports. Jim Hesse, a chief intelligence officer for the I.N.S., says that the United States Lookout system lists about 6,000. Why the discrepancy? Are there 18,000 stolen blank Italian passports drifting around out there that the United States doesn't know about? Or is Boucar's database wrong? Boucar insists that his numbers are accurate; Hesse trusts his. The only people who really know for sure are the Italians. ''We do not discuss stolen passports,'' a spokesman at the Italian Embassy in Washington says. Given these discrepancies, it's no surprise that the United States visa-waiver program has come under fire since Sept. 11. At a Senate hearing in October, a Justice Department official testified that during a review of a random sample of 1,067 passports stolen from visa-waiver countries, the Justice Department found that almost 10 percent had been used to enter the United States successfully. More than half of the stolen passports were not listed in the I.N.S.'s Lookout database. Of course, that's our problem, not Belgium's. It's easy to forget that when it comes right down to it, even a country like Belgium, with which the United States has a long and amicable relationship, sees this issue through an entirely different lens. Politically, Belgium now takes passport fraud seriously because it reeks of political corruption and bumbling bureaucracy -- not exactly the image the country wants to project. But practically, the loss of a few hundred passports here and there is hardly a matter of grave concern. After all, the people who usually use these passports are not coming into Belgium to wreak havoc there. Their crimes, whatever they are, are usually committed elsewhere. Like terrorism. It's chilling how often it is pointed out to me in Brussels that although terrorists may be passing through Belgium -- or using Belgium as a base of operations, or assuming Belgian identities to slip into other countries -- they aren't killing people or blowing up buildings in Belgium. ''Strictly speaking,'' boasts Glenn Audenaert, the plain-spoken chief of the Belgian federal police, ''Belgium does not have a problem with terrorism. You have a problem with terrorism.'' Jeff Goodell is the author of ''Sunnyvale: The Rise and Fall of a Silicon Valley Family.'' 4807 From: McIntyre Date: Fri Feb 15, 2002 6:08pm Subject: Black Hat Briefings (Vegas) Call for Papers Well folks, it's about that time. Papers and presentations are now being accepted for the Black Hat Briefings 2002 conference. The conference is held from July 31-August 1, 2002 at the Caesars Palace Hotel and Resort in Las Vegas, NV, USA. Papers and requests to speak will be received and reviewed until May 1, 2002. IPlease read the full announcement at: http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-02/bh-usa-02-cfp.html 4808 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Feb 15, 2002 11:49pm Subject: NEW PUBLIC SAFETY APPLICATIONS AND BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AMONG USES ENVISIONED BY FCC AUTHORIZATION OF ULTRA-WIDEBAND TECHNOLOGY http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/News_Releases/2002/nret0203.html Federal Communications Commission 445 12th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20554News media information 202 / 418-0500 TTY: 1-888-835-5322 Internet: http://www.fcc.gov ftp.fcc.gov ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This is an unofficial announcement of Commission action. Release of the full text of a Commission order constitutes official action. See MCI v. FCC. 515 F 2d 385 (D.C. Circ 1974). ------------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE February 14, 2002NEWS MEDIA CONTACT: David Fiske at (202) 418-0513 NEW PUBLIC SAFETY APPLICATIONS AND BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AMONG USES ENVISIONED BY FCC AUTHORIZATION OF ULTRA-WIDEBAND TECHNOLOGY Washington, D.C. - The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) adopted today a First Report and Order that permits the marketing and operation of certain types of new products incorporating ultra-wideband ("UWB") technology. UWB technology holds great promise for a vast array of new applications that have the potential to provide significant benefits for public safety, businesses and consumers in a variety of applications such as radar imaging of objects buried under the ground or behind walls and short-range, high-speed data transmissions. UWB devices operate by employing very narrow or short duration pulses that result in very large or wideband transmission bandwidths. With appropriate technical standards, UWB devices can operate using spectrum occupied by existing radio services without causing interference, thereby permitting scarce spectrum resources to be used more efficiently. This First Report and Order ("Order") includes standards designed to ensure that existing and planned radio services, particularly safety services, are adequately protected. The FCC will act vigorously to enforce the rules and act quickly on any reports of interference. The standards adopted today represent a cautious first step with UWB technology. These standards are based in large measure on standards that the National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") believes are necessary to protect against interference to vital federal government operations. Since there is no production UWB equipment available and there is little operational experience with the impact of UWB on other radio services, the Commission chose in this First Report and Order to err on the side of conservatism in setting emission limits when there were unresolved interference issues. The Commission intends within the next six to twelve months to review the standards for UWB devices and issue a further notice of proposed rule making to explore more flexible standards and address the operation of additional types of UWB operations and technology. *Imaging Systems: Provides for the operation of GPRs and other imaging devices under Part 15 of the Commission's rules subject to certain frequency and power limitations. The operators of imaging devices must be eligible for licensing under Part 90 of our rules, except that medical imaging devices may be operated by a licensed health care practitioner. At the request of NTIA, the FCC will notify or coordinate with NTIA prior to the operation of all imaging systems. Imaging systems include: *Ground Penetrating Radar Systems: GPRs must be operated below 960 MHz or in the frequency band 3.1-10.6 GHz. GPRs operate only when in contact with or within close proximity of, the ground for the purpose of detecting or obtaining the images of buried objects. The energy from the GPR is intentionally directed down into the ground for this purpose. Operation is restricted to law enforcement, fire and rescue organizations, to scientific research institutions, to commercial mining companies, and to construction companies. *Wall Imaging Systems: Wall-imaging systems must be operated below 960 MHz or in the frequency band 3.1-10.6 GHz. Wall-imaging systems are designed to detect the location of objects contained within a "wall," such as a concrete structure, the side of a bridge, or the wall of a mine. Operation is restricted to law enforcement, fire and rescue organizations, to scientific research institutions, to commercial mining companies, and to construction companies. *Through-wall Imaging Systems: These systems must be operated below 960 MHz or in the frequency band 1.99-10.6 GHz. Through-wall imaging systems detect the location or movement of persons or objects that are located on the other side of a structure such as a wall. Operation is limited to law enforcement, fire and rescue organizations. *Medical Systems: These devices must be operated in the frequency band 3.1-10.6 GHz. A medical imaging system may be used for a variety of health applications to "see" inside the body of a person or animal. Operation must be at the direction of, or under the supervision of, a licensed health care practitioner. *Surveillance Systems: Although technically these devices are not imaging systems, for regulatory purposes they will be treated in the same way as through-wall imaging and will be permitted to operate in the frequency band 1.99-10.6 GHz. Surveillance systems operate as "security fences" by establishing a stationary RF perimeter field and detecting the intrusion of persons or objects in that field. Operation is limited to law enforcement, fire and rescue organizations, to public utilities and to industrial entities. *Vehicular Radar Systems: Provides for the operation of vehicular radar systems in the 24 GHz band using directional antennas on terrestrial transportation vehicles provided the center frequency of the emission and the frequency at which the highest radiated emission occurs are greater than 24.075 GHz. These devices are able to detect the location and movement of objects near a vehicle, enabling features such as near collision avoidance, improved airbag activation, and suspension systems that better respond to road conditions. *Communications and Measurement Systems: Provides for use of a wide variety of other UWB devices, such as high-speed home and business networking devices as well as storage tank measurement devices under Part 15 of the Commission's rules subject to certain frequency and power limitations. The devices must operate in the frequency band 3.1-10.6 GHz. The equipment must be designed to ensure that operation can only occur indoors or it must consist of hand-held devices that may be employed for such activities as peer-to-peer operation. Action by the Commission February 14, 2002, by First Report and Order (FCC 02-48). Chairman Powell, Commissioners Abernathy, Copps and Martin, with Commissioners Abernathy, Copps and Martin issuing separate statements. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPhone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf. - George Orwell -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4809 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Sat Feb 16, 2002 0:03am Subject: Security? Huh! This is something I posted to a Minox list when we got off on a security tangent. LX = the model of Minox camera I carry always. If anyone attempts to do penetration studies like this, make CERTAIN the person who hired you is instantly available by telephone, AND you carry the original of a dated and signed authorization specifically detailing why you are there and that you are authorized to do anything or possess anything in fulfillment of your contract. You do not want to spend a day in the local lockup while you wait for your lawyer to track down your client. I can promise you no one else will care nor will the system care in the slightest about contacting your client or taking care of medical needs or anything like that. ==================== I did a penetration study of a government facility within the last several days (no clues when or where). They knew it was going down on that day, but not by whom. I had not been in the building in months. They made a big show of checking my boot heels for the metal taps which of course tripped the metal detector, my largish belt buckle, X-rayed my aluminum cane, completely missed my black LX as I wrapped it in what looked like a well used handkerchief in their little wicker basket and none of them would lower themselves to inspect it. That LX could have been my Case pocket knife or, God forbid, a box cutter or nail file. I had an empty leather holster for a small revolver plainly visible on my belt. They didn't make a single comment on it. If I see an empty holster on someone, I damn well want to know where the weapon is (and in my opinion the safest place for it generally is in the holster). I was going to tell them I had left it in my truck to avoid problems and see if they would admit they had no security in the parking garage nor ID of particular cars. Neither did anyone think to question my carry permit, none of which are valid in DC. After passing these heavy layers of security without incident, I went into the men's room on the first floor and lowered down through the window some string I had previously wrapped around my upper forearm. I had a confederate outside the building tie a pistol-shaped TV remote control to the line and I pulled it back up into the men's room. Previously I had placed a paper label on the remote saying 'this could have been a weapon'. I left it on the CSO's (Cognizant Security Officer's) desk. And I'm not even clever, neither was I slipping Fatimah a hundred bucks to conceal something for me. As an experiment, I did shaving cream several video cameras along my route, and in the hour or so I was in the building, no one bothered to inspect them. The shaving cream was very visible and the facility was in full swing. I dragged a trash can over and stood on it to shaving cream the one camera. Later in my after action report, the cameras merely had been written up to be checked the next day for proper operation by the technicians. I carried the can of shaving cream in my briefcase, and no one questioned that, which is suspicious considering I have a full beard. If I had really been trying to impress the place, I would have read the frequencies of their small area coverage (radio) repeater, and programmed a potent mobile radio in my van to jam coverage of their commo system. I am positive they had no backup, and the only frequency they had other than the repeater was talkaround on the repeater output, and in that building talkaround had no range. I also could have put out a decoy call of some sort and diverted the majority of security to the other end of the facility. I knew it would work and frankly it was not necessary to prove it. The door to the telephone closet was unlocked. I walked in and stole the SMDR report from the printer. I could, in seconds, have disabled all internal and external phone communications into and out of the facility. With a bit more effort I could have jammed their cell phones. It's all eyewash. Security is nonexistent. It's a bank vault door on a grass hut. Although I am not willing to do it as a pure experiment to prove a point, I am virtually certain I could arrange to gain access to a handgun inside the secured area of any public airport in the country. Federalizing security is a BIG mistake. Name one thing the government does properly and efficiently. There may be a few things where they are reasonably effective, like Secret Service dignitary protection, but certainly not efficient. Pay the contractors so they can afford to hire decent people, rework procurement so 250,000 hour a year contracts are not won and lost on a nickel an hour, mandate some training standards, equipment standards, and work out something like bonuses to the officers who have the minimum number of sick days in a quarter or a year, a substantial cash award to the shift with the lowest vehicle expenses. give the Captain on each shift a bunch of signed $50 checks he could hand out at his discretion to officers showing some pride in their appearance, attentiveness to their work and courtesy to visitors, etc. I could write a program like this on contract, we'd have reasonable security and it would be FAR cheaper than the federal government could pull it off. I could go on and on. But you don't want to hear it. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 4810 From: A Grudko Date: Sat Feb 16, 2002 3:35am Subject: Photo Radar Countermeasures * Serious stuff first then some related weekend black humour: 1) We had a product on sale here for a few months which actually defeated the dreaded speed camera. First, I'm not a speed devotee on public roads. Even before my car accident (caused by a speeder on the wrong side of the road) I was a fairly conservative driver. Secondly, as a former LEO and Porsche Club weekend race driver there are clearly times when it is appropriate to drive fast - if you have the skill. So I do not promote speeding. As jma said, the best defence is to not break the law. This being said, the product was a (approx) 5mm thick number plate cover made of a clear material with (I guess) micron thin black vertical stripes through the thickness, spaced about 5mm apart. Viewed from 0 degrees (i.e. directly behind) on you could clearly read the licence number, but as you moved left or right the vertical stripes occluded the plate until you got to 45 degrees, when it blacked out. As the roadside cameras photograph at an angle these plate covers worked. 2) To my knowledge radar/laser detectors are not illegal here in SA and they are openly on sale. I don't use one but I did test one about 5 years ago. This model gave off frequent false alarms which I concluded were caused by the microwave links between GSM cell phone masts. - Original Message - > Actually, Spain is the most dangerous place to drive an automobile in the world. I'd challenge that :-) . I've driven in Spain and felt perfectly safe compared to Johannesburg. Not only do we have horrendous accidents (over 10 000 people killed a year on the roads) , we have a phenomenon known as the 'Kombi Taxi'. This creature is a mutated 9 seater mini bus which somehow seats up to 22 people. * It does not require brakes, mirrors, licence plates, a silencer (muffler), lights or a qualified driver. Windows and body panels are optional. * It can operate continually for 18 hours a day and never needs a service. * Repairs are done at the roadside by mechanics who qualified in a prison workshop and who know how to make a Toyota part work on any other make. * The tyres do not require any tread and the spare was traded for a tank of petrol. * The only required controls are the accelerator and the horn. This amazing vehicle can drive on sidewalks and in emergency lanes, reverse at high speed out of a traffic jam, cross fields, drive through roadside fences, go the wrong way down a one way street. But there is a more serious side to our taxi industry. In Spain, do you have taxi drivers carrying unlicensed AK47s & 9mmps? We do - and they use them! So called taxi wars flare up between rival groups/companies which result in dozens of dead passengers and bystanders every year. A terrible testimony to man's greed and inhumanity. Andy Grudko D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) - Grudko Associates - www.grudko.com , Est. 1981 International business intelligence and investigations - ICQ 146498943 Johannesburg (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax), Pretoria (+27 12) 244 0255 - 244 0256 (Fax) SACI, WAD, CALI, SAMLF, UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom When you need it done right - first time a 4811 From: A Grudko Date: Sat Feb 16, 2002 5:56am Subject: Re: Security? Huh! - Original Message - > If anyone attempts to do penetration studies like this, make CERTAIN the > person who hired you is instantly available by telephone ABSOLUTLY - '97 I was tasked with obtaining possible evidence from a Johannesburg hotel room occupied by my client's employee at their cost, so we had legal right of access to the room given reasonable expectations of privacy etc. 3 days in a row I gained access with no problem, but the evidence was not there. Day 4 a security guard caught me. There was no way I'd assault a guard so we went to the security manager, who did not buy my story. I phoned but the client was in a meeting! I got through to my wife and told her to penetrate the corporate veil - fast ! Meanwhile the police appeared, cautioned me, took my firearm (which I had volunteered). Ten minutes later the client 'phoned and it was all sorted out and I was released. >> You do not want to spend a day in the local lockup while you wait for your lawyer to track down your client. Been there twice, luckilly a 'private suite' both times (I don't want toshare a cell with a Mike Tyson clone). On occasion 2, in 1990, I told the jailer I was carrying a handgun. His answer, 'You won't do anything stupid will you?'. I spent 1.5 hours in Krugersdorp lockup with a loaded 15 shot 9mm on my hip!! > ...could have been ... God forbid, a box cutter or nail file. Coming soon - worldwide registration of Martial Arts practitioners. If you have trained in Judo, Karatie, etc, Wrestling or Boxing you will not be allowed to fly unless you are a member of the WWF, 'cos then we know you're a fake and no threat to national security in Lesotho (small African country). > I had an empty leather holster for a small revolver plainly visible on my > belt. They didn't make a single comment on it. If I see an empty holster > on someone, I damn well want to know where the weapon is... So now you expect logic from airport security? Oy Vey! About 4 years ago singer Michael Jackson arrived at Johannesburg International Airport.As he got off the plane dozens of creaming teenage girls appeared, having somehow penetrated security. If teenage girls can do it who else can? (Things may have improved since we worked at JIA) Andy Grudko D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) - Grudko Associates - www.grudko.com , Est. 1981 International business intelligence and investigations - ICQ 146498943 Johannesburg (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax), Pretoria (+27 12) 244 0255 - 244 0256 (Fax) SACI, WAD, CALI, SAMLF, UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom When you need it done right - first time > And I'm not even clever, neither was I slipping Fatimah a hundred bucks > to conceal something for me. > > As an experiment, I did shaving cream several video cameras along my > route, and in the hour or so I was in the building, no one bothered to > inspect them. The shaving cream was very visible and the facility was in > full swing. I dragged a trash can over and stood on it to shaving cream > the one camera. Later in my after action report, the cameras merely had > been written up to be checked the next day for proper operation by the > technicians. I carried the can of shaving cream in my briefcase, and no > one questioned that, which is suspicious considering I have a full beard. > > If I had really been trying to impress the place, I would have read the > frequencies of their small area coverage (radio) repeater, and programmed > a potent mobile radio in my van to jam coverage of their commo system. I > am positive they had no backup, and the only frequency they had other > than the repeater was talkaround on the repeater output, and in that > building talkaround had no range. I also could have put out a decoy call > of some sort and diverted the majority of security to the other end of > the facility. I knew it would work and frankly it was not necessary to > prove it. > > The door to the telephone closet was unlocked. I walked in and stole the > SMDR report from the printer. I could, in seconds, have disabled all > internal and external phone communications into and out of the facility. > With a bit more effort I could have jammed their cell phones. > > It's all eyewash. Security is nonexistent. It's a bank vault door on a > grass hut. > > Although I am not willing to do it as a pure experiment to prove a point, > I am virtually certain I could arrange to > gain access to a handgun inside the secured area of any public airport in > the country. > > Federalizing security is a BIG mistake. Name one thing the government > does properly and efficiently. There > may be a few things where they are reasonably effective, like Secret > Service dignitary protection, but certainly > not efficient. Pay the contractors so they can afford to hire decent > people, rework procurement so 250,000 hour > a year contracts are not won and lost on a nickel an hour, mandate some > training standards, equipment > standards, and work out something like bonuses to the officers who have > the minimum number of sick days in > a quarter or a year, a substantial cash award to the shift with the > lowest vehicle expenses. give the Captain on > each shift a bunch of signed $50 checks he could hand out at his > discretion to officers showing some pride in > their appearance, attentiveness to their work and courtesy to visitors, > etc. I could write a program like this on contract, we'd have reasonable > security and it would be FAR cheaper than the federal government could > pull it off. > > I could go on and on. But you don't want to hear it. > > Steve > > ******************************************************************* > Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) > Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip > mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com > tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 > "In God we trust, all others we monitor" > ******************************************************************* > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > 4812 From: A Grudko Date: Sat Feb 16, 2002 4:43am Subject: Re: NY Times: How to Fake a Passport (10-Feb-2002) - Original Message - From: Justin T. Fanning > How to Fake a Passport >> This is probably some kind of record, although other problem > countries, like Italy, Argentina and South Africa, refuse to confirm > numbers. In the mid 90s we investigated fake IDs and passports used to get contracts for our emerging cellphone business. Corrupt government officials were issuing totally genuine, usable documents (someone else's name, your photo) for: SA ID - SAR 50 ($9 then) SA Passport - SAR 500 ($90 then) And it goes on today. Andy Grudko D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) - Grudko Associates - www.grudko.com , Est. 1981 International business intelligence and investigations - ICQ 146498943 Johannesburg (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax), Pretoria (+27 12) 244 0255 - 244 0256 (Fax) SACI, WAD, CALI, SAMLF, UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom When you need it done right - first time 4813 From: Shawn Hughes Date: Sat Feb 16, 2002 11:24am Subject: Re: Digest Number 861 Mike, The ability to detect RADAR detectors does exist in the United States. Jurisdictions that forbid the use of detectors, and commercial vehicle enforcement guys have them. I forget the actual name brand, (I think Decatur Electronics is one) but my understanding is that it picks up the signature from the, uh, I want to say tank circuit, but I think it may actually be a mixer oscillator circuit. [ Been a while since I studied transmitter theory. Sorry. :O( ] Anyway, it's sensitive to those emissions like the detectors that can pick up the bias oscillator in a fancy tape recorder. Never used one in the field, suppose it has very mixed results. Something else, too; I don't know if it's been mentioned, even if the items did work, FCC says that anything that intentionally intereferes with an authorized transmission (e.g., RADAR / LIDAR) is illegal, and could get you in trouble for possessing. Shawn 4814 From: Justin T. Fanning Date: Sat Feb 16, 2002 7:14pm Subject: WSJ: The spy next door (Told you my next posting would be more on track... JF) http://www.news-observer.com/monday/business/rtp_nc/Story/909513p-907182c.html The spy next door By BROOKS BARNES, February 11, 2002 The Wall Street Journal Most days, Cindy Sciacca spends her free time at home baking, canning vegetables and finger-painting with her daughter. So why is this mild-mannered Mom buying a miniature video camera to install inside her mailbox? "If there's a terrorist living on my block," says the accountant assistant in Ukiah, Calif., "I'm sure not going to wait to hear about it on the news." Close the curtains: Americans are taking surveillance to a whole new level. Driven by newfound suspicions after Sept. 11, a small but quickly growing number of freelance spies are installing gadgets that were unheard of in the home even a year or so ago -- and whose prices are surprisingly low. Those tiny earphones that Secret Service members use? They're on sale for about $60. Other companies are selling transmitters that track the whereabouts of the family car, gadgets that detect phone taps and video cameras thin enough to slide under doors. One company even offers a lie detector for the home. In all, sales are up 30 percent to 60 percent since last year at spy-gear stores across the country, helping turn security and surveillance into a $5 billion industry. Los Angeles' Bolide International says it has sold 3,200 Spycams in the past two months -- double the number at this time last year. Counter Spy Shops -- a chain that sells everything from $800 sew-on tracking devices to that $4,900 "portable truth machine" --saw orders triple this fall. And SpyWorld, in Carson City, Nev., says sales of counterspy products -- they help you figure out if someone's watching you -- are up 20 percent since September. Of course, all of these gadgets have strong detractors among private citizens and privacy experts. And while there are legal uses for these products, some also have applications that are against the law in many states. On a more practical level, some would-be James Bonds have discovered that the devices either don't work well, or that it's really not worth snooping in the first place. (That camera in Sciacca's mailbox that was supposed to flush out terrorists? It caught the neighbor's black Lab digging in her yard.) Still, a growing number of buyers are giving these devices a try, if only because the drumbeat of upsetting news, from terrorism and anthrax to war, has heightened fears. "The paranoia levels right now are absolutely staggering," says Andrew Moe, owner of Spycam Surveillance Equipment in San Diego. In the past, people couldn't have responded this way; spy cameras, tiny recorders and night-vision goggles either hadn't been developed for home use or were prohibitively expensive. Now they're being snapped up by everyone from security-minded homeowners to mistrusting spouses. Parents are taking to them as much as any group to make sure their children are safe -- or at least doing what they're told. Among the hot sellers: a tiny $800 chip that slips into a backpack and transmits junior's whereabouts to a hand-held device back home. There's also The Ghost, a finger-size microphone that catches conversations clearly, even from inside a shirt pocket. And for the ultimate 007 experience, a company called Armortek International will outfit your car to lay down tacks, tear gas or oil slicks, or shock whoever touches the door. "We sell about 20 or 30 cars with all the bells and whistles each year," says Armortek owner Clint Murphy. (Most go to South America, he says, but a handful stay in the United States.) Mike O'Bannon's spy arsenal was far more modest. The Bakersfield, Calif., software salesman used KeyKatcher, a $59 device that tracks activity on a computer keyboard, to find out that his teenage son Matt was skipping school. (Matt had e-mailed a friend about his plans to spend second period in a city park.) "My son was a little surprised to see me at the park, too," O'Bannon says. "He still has no idea how I busted him." Is all of this legal? Surprisingly, the government doesn't provide as much protection as you might think: Parents can track minor children, and videotaping in your own home, property or business is almost always legal -- even without the subject's knowledge, says Los Angeles privacy lawyer Scott Feldmann. How about recording phone conversations? Everyday folks can do it in 41 states -- as long as one of the parties knows the call is being recorded. (The strictest state: Massachusetts, where secretly recording a conversation can come with a $10,000 fine and a five-year prison term.) Before the terrorist attacks, many states were working to beef up spying laws, but busy lawmakers have put much of that legislation on the back burner. For now, average citizens who dabble in covert surveillance are more likely to face civil lawsuits on other charges -- privacy violations, trespassing or even burglary. In one closely watched case a landlord in Bay Shore, N.Y., was arrested in November for allegedly planting a camera disguised as a smoke detector in a female tenant's bedroom. The charge: burglary. The landlord's lawyer denies any wrongdoing on his client's part. As far as the busy spy shops are concerned, virtually every retailer has a policy that boils down to: We just sell the stuff. "Macy's sells knives," says Arielle Jamil, a general manager for Counter Spy Shops. "But you can't sue Macy's if somebody stabs you with it." Using surveillance devices without breaking the law, she says, is "the customer's responsibility." Legal issues aside, sometimes the results are disappointing. Motion detectors can be set off by a rogue tricycle. Lie-detector experts say at-home tests are easy to fool. And you better hope your husband doesn't go to have his oil changed if you have a tracking device installed under his car. While most spy-gadget retailers and manufacturers concede that some devices require careful use, they defend their products. Besides, says Howard Goldman, whose company makes and sells under-the-car tracking systems, most mechanics "aren't observant enough to notice" the transmitters. And of course, critics ranging from psychiatrists to privacy advocates say routine use of surveillance devices is paranoid, unhealthy and generally creepy. "It's not anywhere close to acceptable behavior in a civilized society," says Jeffrey Rosen, author of "The Unwanted Gaze" and a constitutional-law professor at George Washington University. "This orgy of voyeurism is hardly justified by fears about security." So what do you do if you're afraid of being spied on? Well, there's always counterspying. Dwight Des Rosiers, a helicopter pilot in Anchorage, Alaska, bought a $35 software program that helps him scour government-agency databases for his name. "These days," he says, "the government is spying on us all." And then there's Thomas Crowley, a bartender at New York's Bar 89 restaurant. He recently discovered that, with advancing technology making these devices cheaper and easier to hide, almost anything's possible in the spy game. There are even video cameras in neckties, like the one Crowley recently went shopping for ($500, in paisley). What will he do with it? "Wouldn't you like to know?" he says. 4815 From: Fernando Martins Date: Sun Feb 17, 2002 8:12am Subject: Sicur 2002 http://www.sicur.ifema.es/default_i.html Anyone going to Madrid, 26 February - 1 March? SICUR 2002 - The 13th edition of the International Security, Safety and Fire Exhibition will take place at the Juan Carlos I Exhibition Centre between 26th February and 1st March. SECTORS . Security against intrusion, robbery and aggression . Fire Prevention, detection and extinction . Safety and hygiene at work. . Traffic and Transport security and safety . Natural risk control services and equipment . Nuclear safety and Security. . Security in Information Systems. . Institutions and Agencies . Specialized literature FM 4816 From: Fernando Martins Date: Sun Feb 17, 2002 7:17am Subject: RE: NEW PUBLIC SAFETY APPLICATIONS AND BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AMONG USES ENVISIONED BY FCC AUTHORIZATION OF ULTRA-WIDEBAND TECHNOLOGY I have some questions about this ... My interest is in the use of UWB for surveillance systems. a) Where can I get more technical details about UWB? b) What most likely vendors will have this kind of new products sooner? c) What kind of technics an intruder may use against this defense? d) What complementary defenses should be applied? Thanks in advance for any answers FM 4817 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Sun Feb 17, 2002 8:03pm Subject: CIA Showcases Array Of Spy Gadgets http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,1282,-1525936,00.html CIA Showcases Array Of Spy Gadgets Sunday February 17, 2002 7:40 PM SIMI VALLEY, Calif. (AP) - For the first time, the public is getting a large scale view of the CIA's and KGB's real-life James Bond gadgets, from a replica of the Russians' deadly poison-dart umbrella to some of the Amercians' most ingeniously concealed cameras. The exhibit, which opened to the public Sunday at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, includes dozens of items borrowed from the CIA's collection in Langley, Va., many of them never before shown to the public. ``Questions have been asked about why we invest so much money in the intelligence community,'' said Lloyd Salvetti, director of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. ``We thought we should team with the president's library to get out our message about why we exist.'' The exhibit also includes items from private collector Keith Melton, and features some fictitious materials, as well. There's the shoe-phone Don Adams, as secret agent Maxwell Smart, wore in the 1960s television comedy series ``Get Smart,'' and the Dr. Evil ring Mike Myers wore in the film ``Austin Powers International Man of Mystery.'' Also on display is a pair of Diana Rigg's leather pants from the hit British TV spy series ``The Avengers.'' The real spy equipment dates as far back as the Revolutionary War. Among the cameras on display is one from 1885 that could be concealed on a person's body. Others, from World War I, were mounted on carrier pigeons. A popular Cold War version slipped into the back of a leather glove. The world's first microdot, a document shrunken down to a tiny point, is also on display. It dates back to 1852. >From the early days of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, there are tire spikes, bombs and ``liberator pistols.'' The latter were mass produced for $1.72 each and dropped to resistance fighters during World War II. ``Some of the very same techniques used during World War II are being used in Afghanistan today,'' said Toni Hiley, curator of the exhibit and of the CIA museum at Langley, though she declined to elaborate. Spy gadgets from the other side are on display as well, including a replica of a large wooden seal of the United States that was a gift from the Soviet Union to Moscow's U.S. Embassy in 1945. It hung over the ambassador's desk for seven years before the listening device was discovered. Many of the gadgets used by the Soviet Union and the United States look remarkably similar. But one device CIA officials say they never had was a version of the KGB's deadly umbrella that was used by an unknown assailant to kill Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978. A model of the umbrella is part of the display. The pinnacle of the display, Salvetti said, is the leather binder in which the president receives his daily intelligence reports. Until the early 1990s, the very existence of such briefings was classified. The empty binder is on loan from the White House for the length of the exhibit, which runs until July 14. ^--- On the Net: Reagan Library: http://www.reaganlibrary.net/ CIA: http://www.cia.gov/ Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002 -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPhone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf. - George Orwell -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4818 From: David Alexander Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 2:52am Subject: dangerous drivers >From: DrPepper >Subject: Re: Photo Radar Countermeasures > >Actually, Spain is the most dangerous place to >drive an automobile in the world. >The seem to have no sense of danger out on >the highways, and lethal accidents are very common > Try Rome, I wouldn't set out into that traffic in anything less well protected than a Main Battle Tank. Oh, and a lot of Prozac... _______________________________ David Alexander M.INSTIS Global Infrastructure Director Bookham Technology plc Tel: +44 (0) 1327 356264 Mobile: +44 (0) 7799 881284 Fax: +44 (0) 1327 356775 http://www.bookham.com ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 4819 From: David Alexander Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 3:23am Subject: re: radar detectors It doesn't matter how good your detector is, they will still get you... This is a true story: About 12 years ago I was talking to an American drag-racer friend of mine who boasted that the cops couldn't get him for speeding. He said he had a police radio scanner, another on the helicopter frequency, a radar detector and a CB. That would warn him of anything. A few months later I saw him again and he told me "The b*stards got me in New Mexico with a stopwatch and I lost my licence" I would be lying if I said I had not laughed till I cried. _______________________________ David Alexander M.INSTIS Global Infrastructure Director Bookham Technology plc Tel: +44 (0) 1327 356264 Mobile: +44 (0) 7799 881284 Fax: +44 (0) 1327 356775 http://www.bookham.com ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 4820 From: Michael Puchol Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 8:23am Subject: Re: Photo Radar Countermeasures > Actually, Spain is the most dangerous place to > drive an automobile in the world. > The seem to have no sense of danger out on > the highways, and lethal accidents are very common I'd actually say it's Portugal, aswell as a good number of African countries. In Portugal the method seems to be that if you drive slow, you do so half-side of your car into the curb - thus leaving a 'virtual' third lane where fast traffic can overtake, even in bends with NO visibility. This way they can fit three cars in the space meant for two.... Another interesting thing I've observed is that, having spent several years in the UK, and having seen that the driving there is a LOT more sensible than in Spain, you really must see English tourists with rented cars in the Balearic islands - they are even more reckless than the locals (also applies to tourists from other countries, not just the UK). Logic dictates either that: a) The air in Spain has something that turns calm and law-abiding drivers into complete maniacs. b) The laws in the UK and other EU countries are much more strict AND they are enforced. I'd go for b) - in Spain it's very easy to get away with traffic violations. Most people just don't pay fines, and as the system is really slow, they end up forgotten. Until the new law came in effect a couple of weeks ago, if you killed someone with a car while driving recklessly, you'd get at the most a six-month suspension of your license - which is pathetic. All the best, Mike 4821 From: Ed Naylor Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 11:31am Subject: ULTRA WIDEBAND UPDATE /5/ ZDNet http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-839310.html Ultrawideband: Rescuers left in the lurch? Ben Charny February 15, 2002 Firefighters and law enforcement agencies are likely the losers from this week's Federal Communications Commission decision allowing the sale of products based on ultrawideband, a superfast wireless signal. When the FCC on Thursday decided to make ultrawideband (UWB) available commercially, it set a limit on how powerful the signal can be. The FCC explained the limitations were to help allay fears that UWB's powerful signals would interfere with military operations or broadcasts from television and radio stations. As a result, companies like Florian Wireless and Time Domain say the UWB equipment they are each developing for rescue workers, with some already in trials, won't be powerful enough to be of much use. [[part of item deleted]] An FCC spokesman could not be reached for comment Friday. Some FCC sources acknowledge the new rules might weaken the signal's strength, but they are unsure if companies have conducted appropriate tests. UWB technology provides a faster and more secure way of sending wireless transmissions. Automakers could use the technology to build collision avoidance systems or improve airbags. Consumer products, from laptops to personal digital assistants, could use the equipment to send and receive video or audio. One of its other proposed uses was for fire and rescue personnel. The powerful UWB signal can chew through flames, smoke and building materials to provide the firefighter's three-dimensional location at all times, and it can be used to help map the inside of a burning building. It also sends back the firefighter's heart rate, and the temperature around him, which can be used to decide firefighting tactics. Houston rescue workers have been using UWB technology in trials, and Time Domain was granted a waiver by the FCC in 2000 to sell 2,500 of its "Radar Vision" equipment to law enforcement agencies. "Radar Vision" uses UWB signals to spot motion behind walls, giving an edge to officers confronting a hostage situation, for instance. A handful of police agencies are testing UWB equipment now, with the aim of possibly using it in the future. But "the products they have now won't be legal to operate under these rules," Ross said. The company doubts that the equipment they've been developing will be as effective under the FCC's new rules, Ross said. UWB wireless networks now won't be able to pinpoint someone's location as effectively, Florian Wireless Chief Executive Brian Valania said. [[part of item deleted]] Houston rescue workers were expected to start using this equipment from Florian Wireless by May or June of this year, he said. He doesn't know if the deal will go forward. © 2002 (ZDNet) CNET Networks, Inc. -- -- -- -- -- 4822 From: Michael Puchol Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 4:21pm Subject: Re: Sicur 2002 Well, for anyone that is going, there should be a demo of the vehicle tracking system I developed in the Kenwood stand - a good friend & colleague of mine will be at the stand, as I will be busy having my first baby boy (well, my wife will be having it, I will be fainting around the room I guess) - scheduled arrival on the 28th of Feb :-)) Cheers all, Mike ----- Original Message ----- From: "Fernando Martins" To: Sent: Sunday, February 17, 2002 3:12 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] Sicur 2002 > > http://www.sicur.ifema.es/default_i.html > > Anyone going to Madrid, 26 February - 1 March? > > SICUR 2002 - The 13th edition of the International Security, Safety and > Fire Exhibition will take place at the Juan Carlos I Exhibition Centre > between 26th February and 1st March. > SECTORS > . Security against intrusion, robbery and aggression > . Fire Prevention, detection and extinction > . Safety and hygiene at work. > . Traffic and Transport security and safety > . Natural risk control services and equipment > . Nuclear safety and Security. > . Security in Information Systems. > . Institutions and Agencies > . Specialized literature > > FM > > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > 4823 From: Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 5:30am Subject: Driving I would nominate Saudi Arabia as the worst with children driving high power cars. And a total disregard of speed limits, etc. Whatever Allah wills is the norm, if he wants you to have an accident you will. As far as tourists go the adage only 2 cars can go anywhere, A Range Rover and a hire car. Brian [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 4824 From: Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 3:39am Subject: Re: Photo Radar Countermeasures > Actually, Spain is the most dangerous place to > drive an automobile in the world. > The seem to have no sense of danger out on > the highways, and lethal accidents are very common If there was one place to avoid, I would say it's Egypt. I believe their drivers test is to drive 15 feet forward, 15 feet in reverse. I think I read it in the Guinness Book of Records as the easiest drivers test. Robert Pickett Pickett Investigative Agency 503-589-0268 or 866-589-4 A PI (4274) http://www.pickettinvestigativeagency.com We accept PayPal! 4825 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 6:33pm Subject: Focus-Spy tech goes on show http://uk.news.yahoo.com/020218/80/cshc6.html Monday February 18, 01:11 PM Focus-Spy tech goes on show By Kevin Krolicki LOS ANGELES (Reuters) - Hollywood loves a good spy and the feeling is mutual -- now the studios and "The Company," as the CIA is sometimes known, are marking more than a half-century of mutual fascination with the largest public display ever of spy gadgets, both real and imagined. The exhibit, which opened at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library near Los Angeles on Saturday, ranges from the whimsical to the deadly, everything from the shoe phone made famous by Don Adams in the TV show "Get Smart" to a KGB umbrella used to shoot poison-tipped darts of a kind once used to assassinate a Bulgarian dissident in London. The show, "Secrets from the CIA, KGB and Hollywood," also includes the tarantula that threatened James Bond in "Dr. No," Emma Peal's leather pants from "The Avengers," and a 19th century spy camera designed to be strapped to a pigeon. The blend of fact and fiction is fitting, given the way that the Cold War clandestine productions sometimes followed the lead of the celluloid spooks and sometimes anticipated them in ways that their Hollywood creators never imagined. THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE MOVIES "Many of the people who work for the CIA grew up on these spy shows just like I did," said Danny Biederman, a screenwriter, whose lifelong fascination with the genre prompted the collection of more than 4,000 props and gizmos on partial display. Biederman loaned his souvenirs to the CIA two years ago for an eyes-only exhibit at the agency's headquarters in Virginia. Now, the CIA museum (motto: "The Best Museum You've Never Seen") has taken that show to the public at the Reagan Library, along with a sampling of spy artifacts from the National Archives and the private collection of Keith Melton. The real-world spy gear on display ranges from a hollowed-out bullet used during the America Revolution to hide secret messages to a replica of an elaborate carved seal presented by the Soviet Union to the U.S. Ambassador shortly after the Second World War, complete with hidden listening device. "There's a progression here of the development of the technology of espionage," said Lloyd Salveti, the director of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, on hand for the exhibit opening in Simi Valley, California. The CIA's purpose in sponsoring the exhibit is to stress the role the intelligence service has played in presidential decision-making, Salvetti said. To that end, one of the binders used for President George W. Bush's daily CIA briefings is on hand, emptied of course of its sensitive contents. But the bigger question raised by the exhibit may be how much the Hollywood spy genre borrowed from events and where it anticipated or shaped the way the spy game has been played. British author Ian Fleming, who created the archetypal spy in James Bond, had also been a British naval intelligence officer, an important precedent in blurring the lines between modern spy fact and fiction, Biederman said. Or consider that the CIA's real-life Office of Technical Services, where covers are created and a new generation of spy gadgets made, has a creative motto that would make any movie studio proud: "Imagine what is possible -- then prepare to be amazed." CLOAK AND DAGGERS Spies have even played movie people, most famously in 1979 when Iranian militants stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held some 50 hostages. As the incident unfolded, six U.S. diplomats managed to find refuge in the nearby Canadian Embassy, prompting a successful CIA-directed plan to smuggle them out by sending agents into Iran disguised as a film crew. "This would not have been possible without the close cooperation of the patriotic people of Hollywood," said Salvetti. Biederman, who lives in Los Angeles with his wife and three children Ilya, Moriah Flint and Bond all named for fictional spies, said some in the agency also shared his love for TV classics like "The Man from U.N.C.L.E." Some CIA agents told him that in the 1960s, "they would be watching 'Mission Impossible' and saying 'Why can't we come up with something like this?'" -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPhone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf. - George Orwell -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4826 From: Robert Dyk Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 9:08pm Subject: ISDN Polytel System While out this evening I discovered a bridge tap set up on a PolyTel video conferencing system. The bridge was built out in a telephone closet from the 3 ISDN lines that were connected to the video conferencing system. The bridges were terminated on a BIX RJ11 adapter block with three phone cords (one per line) still connected. No other hardware was present. The original patch from the vertical system to the horizontal cabling was intact with the secondary loops punched over top of the original patch, (not allowed on a BIX setup). I can only think of illegitimate reasons to do this. Is anyone on the list familiar with the Polytel and or what is required to compromise the video conference on this triple bonded ISDN setup. Thanks in advance for any input. Robert Dyk dyk@c... 4827 From: tek492p Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 11:05pm Subject: Re: ISDN Polytel System --- In TSCM-L@y..., "Robert Dyk" wrote: The > bridges were terminated on a BIX RJ11 adapter block with three phone cords > (one per line) still connected. No other hardware was present. Could this (RJ11 adapter block) be used for testing purposes, and not an actual bridge tap? Jack Lindauer Intertect TSCM services Los Angeles (818) 831-0515 4828 From: Date: Mon Feb 18, 2002 7:03pm Subject: counter countre measures From a NMA member, REPOSTING This is a warning for all radar detector users. The NMA recently learned that there is a new wave of radar detector detectors on the market. These devices actually exceed the capabilities of the previous VG-2 detector. This new technology is enabling law enforcement to detect your radar detector. We realize this may not be a problem to most drivers. However, this can be a big problem for commercial truck drivers (who are prohibited by federal law to utilize radar detectors) and to anyone traveling in Virginia, Washington DC, and some parts of Canada. These areas prohibit the use of radar detectors and with this new technology, the police will know if you have one or not. While this is not earth shattering news, the NMA hopes that this will help drivers avoid the citations in areas where detectors are prohibited. Eric Skrum Communications Director National Motorists Association 608/849-6000 nma@m... www.motorists.org Advocating, Protecting, and Representing the Rights of North American Motorists 4829 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Tue Feb 19, 2002 0:14am Subject: Absolutely outrageous The security industry has some of the most incredibly ignorant morons imaginable. I happened to notice this in the wire services a few minutes ago. I am literally speechless. Maybe for the first time in my life. Has the industry come to this? The following was on the tail end of an article about some guy who got caught with some firecracker type pyros at LAX (Los Angeles International). ==================== "In an unrelated incident at New York's La Guardia Airport, a flight that had left for Cleveland was forced to return after it was discovered a passenger was not properly screened. A concourse was evacuated and everyone was screened again." ==================== Whomever is in charge of Security at La Guardia ought to work the rest of his live in irons to pay for the waste of money, time, and most of all the inconvenience to the passengers on this flight. Make me emperor and I'd have him in a pillory 24 hours a day in the main terminal. And there'd be an ample supply of baskets full of rotten fruit. Maybe I'd put him in a cage in series with the septic system. If I had the money, I'd start an airline where I'd issue weapons to passengers who wanted them. Since we'd be off the ground and out of their jurisdictions, I would thumb my nose at any government comments. And my airline would be the safest one in the world. A CONCOURSE was evacuated? The idiot who made that decision could get the same warm wet feeling by wetting his pants. ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 4830 From: Lt. Aaron D. Osgood Date: Tue Feb 19, 2002 7:28am Subject: Polytel Could be that the in house "Phone Guy" doesn't understand ISDN and went looking for dial tone in the wrong places. Aaron D. Osgood Omega Services ? Wired & Wireless Telecommunications Consulting ? Telco Vendor Relations Management 67 Field Road Falmouth, ME 04105 TEL: 207-781-7441 FAX: 207-781-8067 E Page: 2078315829@m... AlphaPage: 888-413-3030 PIN 19589# OzCom@m... 4831 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Tue Feb 19, 2002 8:00am Subject: British marines invade Spain by mistake British marines invade Spain by mistake Story filed: 14:27 Monday 18th February 2002 Press Association/Ananova Defence chiefs have apologised after a detachment of British commandos accidentally "invaded" Spain. The 20 Royal Marines, based near Arbroath, roared up a beach in their amphibious landing craft and leapt ashore brandishing assault rifles and mortars. Bemused Spanish fishermen in the town of La Linea de la Concepcion watched as 45 Commando began deploying tactically in the sand. In the end, two local policemen took it upon themselves to point out to the marines that Gibraltar - the intended target of their seaborne landing exercise - was actually a little further on down the coast. There was apparently a brief flurry of apologies from the red-faced commandos before the men jumped back into their craft and motored further south. The gaffe comes at a time of delicate negotiations over the future of Gibraltar, which was taken by Britain in 1704. Nine years later The Rock was ceded to Britain for ever under the Treaty of Utrecht. A Ministry of Defence spokesman said the "regrettable" incident happened during an exercise by Royal Marines travelling on HMS Ocean, the Royal Navy's helicopter and commando carrier. "In the course of the exercise, a landing craft meant to land in Gibraltar, but made it a few yards down the beach, on the Spanish side," he said. "There is much embarrassment, the error is regretted and lessons have been learned. They were informed of their error by local policemen and spent only about five minutes on the beach." He added: "We were not trying to take Spain and have no plans to do so." -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPhone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf. - George Orwell -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4832 From: Robert Dyk Date: Tue Feb 19, 2002 8:07am Subject: RE: Absolutely outrageous Steve, Thank you for being the voice of reason in a sea of ignorant paranoia. If you form the airline, I'll buy the first ticket... Robert Dyk dyk@c...